Fractures and Fault Lines: Growth and Equity in California's Megaregions

Chris Benner
Human and Community Development
University of California, Davis

Manuel Pastor
Geography and American Studies & Ethnicity
University of Southern California

Acknowledgements:
We would like to thank Jennifer Tran and Vanessa Carter for valuable research assistance, and Petra Todorovich, Stephen Wheeler, and all the participants in the America 2050 Healdsburg Research Seminar for helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

I. Introduction

When Carl Stokes was elected mayor of Cleveland in 1967, he became the first African American mayor of a major U.S. city. It was an exciting outcome of years of civil rights organizing, and it heralded a new move of African-Americans into political leadership in major cities across the U.S. Indeed, within ten years, more than 200 black mayors held office, and by 1993, 67 of the country's largest urban centers were headed by African Africans (Colburn and Adler 2005). The opening of new political space in the country's urban governance structures created hope for addressing long-standing patterns of entrenched urban poverty and racial inequality. Yet, as these new African-American mayors discovered, the changing form of U.S. cities was undermining the effectiveness of city government as a tool in addressing poverty and inequality. With growing suburbanization, white flight, and relocation of businesses to the urban periphery, many new mayors found themselves taking office in the context of declining tax bases, growing inner-city poverty, and deteriorating infrastructure. Their ability to have a significant impact on poverty and inequality was severely hampered by processes of urban change beyond the boundaries of their political influence.

The frustrations associated with these consequences of urban sprawl have led some equity proponents to suggest that attention should be lifted from the city to the metropolitan region. A growing regional equity movement has been taking root around the country, as coalitions of equity advocates have made major strides in identifying regional causes of poverty, while developing solutions to urban poverty and building political power at a regional scale. Unfortunately, just as such advocates have made the adjustment to the regional scale, the continued evolution of American urban areas into sprawling megaregions raises a concern that equity advocates today may be facing the same dilemma as urban reformers in the 1960s: they are arriving to power just as the scale of power and the economy are shifting up and out. David Rusk earlier argued that community developers needed to couple an *inside game* of city organizing with an *outside game* of shifting regional rules; perhaps the new challenge for equity advocates is how to complement the new *inside game* of organizing within metropolitan regions, with an *outside game* that addresses the continued spread of housing and jobs to more far flung reaches of our megalopolises (Rusk 1999).

In trying to understand how the emergence of megaregions affects opportunities for addressing equity, we see three underlying questions: (1) Is this the level at which significant problems of inequality are being caused? (2) Is this the level at which problems of inequality can be effectively addressed via new policy? And (3) Is this the level at which the politics of coalitions for equity can be organized and sustained?

To some extent, the answers to each of these three questions are separable. We argue elsewhere (see Pastor, Benner and Matsuoka, forthcoming 2008) that a burgeoning regional equity movement has emerged partly because the answer to the first two questions is affirmative in the case of more traditionally defined metropolitan areas – inequality has many roots in regional processes, while regional land use and other policies (such as insuring affordable housing in suburbs, redesigning workforce to connect low-income residents to regional labor markets, and reconfiguring transportation to better address the needs of the poor) can make a difference. However, we contend that the most important reason why regional equity has gained ground involves the third question above: the metropolitan region seems to be a level at which organizers and activists stand a chance of generating the political will to do something about unequal income and other disparities. At the metro level, we argue, the problems of inequality are seen face-to-face and neighbor-to-neighbor – particularly since the traditional means of escaping to suburbs to avoid central city problems has become increasingly untenable as suburbs have diversified racially and seen sharp increases in concentrations of poverty (Puentes and Warren 2006 ; Orfield 2002) As a result, numerous equity advocates have been connecting the dots and "thinking and linking" to the region (Pastor et al. 2000): from the interfaith organizers in the Gamaliel Foundation[1] to the labor-affiliated think-and-do tanks in the Partnership for Working Families[2] network to the grassroots efforts of community organizations in the Right to the City Alliance,[3] a new movement oriented around principles of regional equity seems to be afoot in America.

While the emergence of regional thinking by social justice advocates has also occurred in places like Detroit and Milwaukee, the evolution has been particularly pronounced in California. The Bay Area has played host to a wide series of efforts, including one of the country's premier labor-oriented research and policy shops (Working Partnerships, USA),[4] a multi-sector and multi-county Social Equity Caucus[5] that has played a role as the social justice voice in several business-oriented regionalist efforts, and an emerging set of alliances between local groups pressing for region-wide environmental equity. Los Angeles, perhaps even more than the Bay Area, has become an epicenter for regional equity action. Here, organiz-

1 http://www.gamaliel.org/
2 http://www.communitybenefits.org/
3 http://www.righttothecity.org/
4 http://www.wpusa.org/
5 http://urbanhabitat.org/sec

ers have challenged the metropolitan transit authority to shift resources to the buses that serve the region's working poor, environmental justice advocates have battled the Air Quality Management District until they abandoned elements of an emissions trading system that was producing toxic "hot spots" in low-income communities of color, and labor-affiliated activists have recently taken on both region-serving industries, such as cleaning services, and region-serving destinations, such as the Staples Center and the Los Angeles airport.[6]

Yet these efforts in both the Bay Area and Los Angeles have not generally been multi-metro. It has been enough of a challenge to scale up to the region, some would argue, and the upward shift from the neighborhood to the metropolitan scale is still a stretch for many; in this light, the megaregion scale, with its even larger number of governments and economic clusters, may seem frankly insurmountable for equity organizers and advocates. But if the economic and political action is moving in that direction, perhaps those concerned with social equity organizers should have a response.

This paper tries to point the ways to the elements of such a response. Analyzing the dynamics of growth and equity in the Northern and Southern California megaregions, we argue the following points. First, while there are some megaregional scale processes that are important forces shaping equity—most prominently those related to infrastructure and environmental health—the issues likely to gain traction at a megaregional scale are different than those at a metropolitan level and may not have as immediate an impact on patterns of inequality as other processes, such as housing, labor markets and transportation processes, that primarily unfold at a regional scale. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we see few immediate opportunities for policy solutions to inequality at a megaregional scale. Third, and more optimistically, there are emerging megaregional policy platforms—for example centered around equity within the logistics industry in Southern California, and environmental justice in Northern California—that could potentially revolutionize both the economy and political organizing in the future. But for such megaregional policy processes to matter for equity advocates, the constituencies for equity must also be mobilized at this scale, and this is difficult. Some organizations are clearly stepping up to the task, but it is a new and sometimes unnatural fit for base-building groups that are more rooted in their local and regional constituencies.

Our central point, however, is *not* to argue against the importance of a megaregional perspective for addressing equity. In contrast, we are intrigued and indeed excited by new efforts to build alliances at this broader scale, and can imagine these megaregional alliances strengthening over time. But they are more likely to be important around a limited set of issues, and to serve as an important complement to the more comprehensive equity organizing we see growing at a regional scale across the country. To pave the way, we suggest that megaregional analysts will need to expand from the important planning and land-use perspective that have been the core of research to date in this relatively young but dynamic field, and build a more political-economy informed analysis of the social forces shaping these processes.

We begin below by providing a brief discussion of previous research in two areas: the relationship between growth and equity at a regional scale and the role of equity in the context of megaregions. We then move into a quantitative analysis of megaregional patterns of economic growth and inequality in California, starting by comparing California's megaregions to other megaregions in the U.S., then comparing the Northern and Southern California megaregions to each other, and finally looking at growth and equity dynamics between three distinct areas within each megaregion: the core, periphery, and a more remote sphere of influence. Following this, we provide an analysis of political and social forces shaping growth and equity dynamics, first in Northern California and then in Southern California. Our conclusion then returns to a more detailed discussion of the opportunities and challenges of incorporating megaregions into our understanding of the problems of social inequality, potential solutions to inequality, and for building the political will and capacity to actually address inequality.

II. Achieving Equity: Moving from Regions to Megaregions

Equity has been given relatively short shrift in the literature on megaregions. Given the youth of megaregions as an analytical framework, the somewhat scattered coverage of issues of social inequality is understandable. After all, there is still a significant debate simply on how to define megaregions! Still, the relative lack of attention does raise serious questions about whether this is simply the typical state of a field in development or whether it says something about the nature of the megaregional scale itself. Dewar and Epstein point to a fundamental issue when they note that: "One major problem of the megaregion scale for policy making and planning is that it veils inequities within the region that need to be addressed for social justice reasons" (Dewer and Epstein 2007:121).

Can equity issues be effectively raised at the megaregional level? In what little has been written on equity and megaregions, it is possible to identify three broad perspectives: one centered on industry, one on growth politics, and one on policy applications and reform. The geographic distribution of industry, for example, relates to opportunities for a people with a range of incomes within a megaregion. Feser and Hewings provide evidence that industry value-chains may be dispersing across megaregions, as they provide evidence that metropolitan regions are "hollowing-out" and becoming less dependent on internal *regional* sources for the supply of inputs, but intra-*megaregional* trade does not seem to have changed (Feser and Hewings 2007). This reinforces Saskia Sassen's argument that a megaregion may be large enough to contain the entire value chain for an industry, which is perhaps more difficult within a single metropolitan region (Sassen 2007). By incorporating all levels of production, industries can enable a wide income range within a single megaregion. The literature has not yet carried these conclusions through to workforce policy implications but it does suggest an opportunity to make key industries play a more prominent role in providing a broader set of opportunities; this is, for example, exactly the argument that some have made in Southern California about the logistics industry.

Can equity and economic growth be better linked at the megaregional level? There is evidence that keeping equity among the foremost concerns will actually help promote *metropolitan* economic growth. Sharp disparities and unequal opportunities seem to be associated with an erosion of the social capital that ties regions together, leading to underinvestment in basic human capital, significant conflict over the direction of economic development, and a general desire to jump the regional ship in favor of less problematic circumstances. A recent study by economists at the Cleveland Federal Reserve Board of nearly 120 mid-size metropolitan areas found that a skilled workforce, high levels of racial inclusion and income equality do, in fact, correlate strongly and positively with economic growth, even controlling for other factors including a number

6 There are a wide range of organizations involved in these various initiatives, who have worked together over nearly two decades now to build intersecting networks of regional equity advocates. See (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2008; Gottlieb et al. 2005; Milkman 2006)

of more traditional business and quality of life variables (Eberts, Erickcek, and Kleinhenz 2006). A recent study by Pastor and Benner demonstrates that this positive effect of equity on growth holds across U.S. metro areas more generally and is as strong in "weak market" regions as in strong market areas (Pastor and Benner 2008).[7]

What, however, is the relationship between economic growth and social equity at the megaregional level? While the theoretical arguments still hold in general, there is reason to suspect that the relationship may be weaker, primarily because the megaregion may be too large to capture the benefits of social capital. Finding the answer is difficult: with only ten megaregions in the United States, it is hard to run the sort of regressions that have preoccupied researchers exploring the relationship between equity and growth at the metropolitan level. In the data analysis below, we do show a positive equity-growth relationship but issues of causality cannot be settled; if we are to argue for equity at the megaregional level, we cannot avoid making the basic normative argument about opportunity for all; at the same time, we will see that any such argument must be integrated into a basic economic strategy to gather allies.

The dynamics of the politics around population growth within megaregions is another area for distributional concerns. Population tends to grow more quickly in low-density areas, which are typically poorer than high-density areas: "The relationship between income and megaregion growth shows that people are not moving to richer areas." (Glaeser 2007) Although wages are more modest in outlying, low-density areas, homes tend to be more affordable as well, with lower land prices and economies of scale through large-scale greenfields developments. Often, such growing communities are new communities without entrenched grassroots leadership, and thus Glaeser's work implies that where growth is happening the most, there is perhaps the least chance for grassroots pushback. At the same time, John et al. (2007) suggests that central cities have significant power over the economic growth of the megaregion. While they identify the affects of a central city on the megaregion, their conclusions mostly applies to metropolitan scale leadership. Local officials could, and arguable should, unite to steer megaregional economies, but when megaregional governance is lacking, the central city may fill the gap (John, Tickell, and Musson 2005).

On the policy side, Jones (2007) provides the most complete picture, shifting focus from analyzing megaregions *per se* to analyzing equitable policy at the megaregional level. He rightly reminds us that equity must be put at the forefront or it will be forgotten (Jones 2007); his analysis largely adopts an earlier framework developed by Blackwell and Fox (Blackwell and Fox 2004), which is focused primarily on *regional equity*. He argues that megaregional strategies would seem to be better at addressing inter-metro disparities – such as that between core and periphery – than at addressing the city-suburb metro differences that have been at the heart of the regional equity movement.[8] As Jones (2007:8) notes:

> Unlike transportation or landscape preservation, where there are clearly reasons to plan on a scale that extends beyond metropolitan boundaries, it is more difficult to identify distribution issues that need to be addressed through interventions at this level of aggregation. National policies and metropolitan development patterns clearly affect income distribution, but the effects of policies at the intermediate scale of megaregions are less apparent. Also, the issues at stake—access to jobs and affordable housing, school quality and funding, the delivery of government services—usually resonate most strongly at the local level. Mobilizing political constituencies to address equity at a multi-state scale without a government entity to target is a stretch.

In short, as with the growth-equity relationship, one cannot simply assume that what is operative at a metropolitan scale will work or be applicable at a megaregional scale.

The Southern California Association of Government (SCAG) and San Francisco Planning and Urban Research (SPUR) have started applying the megaregion framework to megaregional policy in California policy, with a certain degree of attention to equity. Indeed in a report developed by three Councils of Government in the Southern California megaregion, they devoted one-fourth of their strategies to equity (along with sustainability, prosperity, and financing). The actual equity policy recommendations, however, which focused on a balanced housing supply and ensuring equity in all plans and actions, remain vague and partially formulated (KERNCOG, SANDAG, and SCAG 2005).

Gabriel Metcalf and Egon Terplan at SPUR (San Francisco Planning and Urban Research) link equity policy primarily to transit infrastructure. By linking "cold" and "hot" cores through improved transit connections, they argue, the job market could be opened to more workers (Metcalf and Terplan 2007). However, a cautionary tale about such an approach comes from Camden, New Jersey, where a highly efficient light-rail transit connection links this desperately poor community to the large job center of downtown Philadelphia in a short, ten-minute ride. Despite the direct transit connection and an unemployment rate of 16 percent, in 2000 only 0.3 percent of Philadelphia central city jobs were filled by Camden residents, and only 7 percent of Camden employed residents worked anywhere in the city of Philadelphia.[9] Clearly there are many more things needed besides effective transit links to address persistent poverty.

One of these is political power: forcing larger systems to steer appropriate resources to the difficult and multi-faceted problems of poverty requires organizing and influence. While academics have begun to think about planning and policy for megaregions, political strategies, particularly to support equity, are largely absent to date from the literature. There is not even consensus about which issues to rally behind. SPUR suggests transportation and environment (Metcalf and Terplan 2007). Glaesar (2007) thinks housing should be a local strategy while there is nascent attention to this at a megaregional scale amongst Councils of Government in Southern California (KERNCOG, SANDAG, and SCAG 2005). Should workforce development be included? Education? And once the best issues are chosen, who takes action? John et al (2005) seem to suggest that megaregions could best be administrated in a top-

7 See also earlier work by Savitch et al. (1993), Barnes and Ledebur (1998), Voith (1998) and Pastor et al. (2000).

8 Jones (2007) points to megaregional tax-sharing as one way to address both inter- and intra-metro differences. This makes sense in theory but very few places have actually gone with that remedy, despite the cogent arguments of Orfield (2002), Rusk (1999) and others,. It is even less likely to happen in California, a place where local control has been important and where even a pilot attempt to introduce limited tax-sharing in the Sacramento region was staunchly opposed by virtually every city in the state and collapsed in the California legislature.

9 Based on U.S. Census data on place of work and place of residence, from the 2000 decennial census, as presented by Chris Benner at Ford Foundation sponsored workshop on Camden Works: Mobility, Opportunity and Development in a Regional Context, October 5-6, 2006. Presentation available at: http://cjtc.ucsc.edu/PowerPoints/camden_benner.pdf

Figure 1: Megaregions in California and their Sub-Megaregion levels

down fashion , while Metcalf and Terplan (2007) encourages a more networked approach to developing initiatives, campaigns, and projects. But who will carry out these campaigns? How will minority voices remain un-diluted among the large numbers of people living in a megaregion? And to whom will the advocates speak?

Reasonably enough, most scholars are calling for improving megaregional *governance,* rather than trying to create unified megaregional governments (Dewar and Epstein 2007). Teitz and Barbour (2007) push the argument by asking if California should continue governing megaregions around single-issues, like transportation or environmental justice, or instead take the leap of transitioning to a more comprehensive megaregional government with reach over several issues (Teitz and Barbour 2007). These questions and varying proposals suggest that scholars are coming to terms with megaregions as an analytical and governance framework; there is, however, much work to be done to understand the implications of megaregions for political strategy and opportunity, especially for the outside actors that generally push larger political systems to consider challenging issues of social equity. We look below at exactly this set of political issues in California's megaregions but first we offer a data profile to contextualize the discussion.

Figure 2: Megaregion Demographics, 2000



III. Patterns of Equity and Growth in California's Megaregions

To examine patterns of equity in the California megaregions, we decided to both compare them to other megaregions and to each other in more detail. To do this, we utilized a multi-region comparative database being developed by Pastor and various colleagues.[10] The database contains a wide variety of information from Census and other sources, all summarized up to Core Base Statistical Areas (CBSAs) and to the principal cities within them. To adapt this data for this exercise, we first used the county definitions of megaregions developed by the America 2050 project of the Regional Plan Association, matched these counties to CBSAs, and then finally defined our megaregions by CBSAs. Because our database is rooted in CBSAs, this process does omit a small number of rural counties that are in megaregions that do not fall into CBSAs. Still, depending on the CBSA, we are still able to account for at least 92 percent of the megaregion's total population in all megaregions as defined by America 2050, and 98.8 percent and 100 percent (respectively) of the Northern California and Southern California megaregion's population.[11] We further refine the definitions of these two California-based megaregions by allocating their CBSAs to sub-megaregional levels of core, periphery, or sphere of influence (See Figure 1, and Appendix 1 for county definition of these sub-megaregional levels). In assigning the various CBSAs to different sub-megaregional levels, we are able to tease out the findings that reveal how indicators of growth and equity vary within these two megaregions of most concern.

The statistics we review in this section suggest a picture of two megaregions with certain similarities to each other, including high levels of immigrants, large non-white populations, growing poverty rates over the 1980s and 1990s, and, perhaps surprisingly, relative low employment growth rates in the 1990s when compared with other regions of the U.S. The two megaregions also have important differences from each other as well, such as Northern California having lower immigration, greater employment growth, higher per capita income, and lower poverty rates than Southern California. The starkest contrasts between the two megaregions, however, emerge when examining intra-megaregional patterns. In Northern California, there are dramatic differences between the core of the Bay Area, and more peripheral regions in the Central Valley, on nearly every measure of growth, poverty, or inequality. In Southern California, these intra-megaregional differences are more muted.

Northern and Southern California in the Context of U.S. Megaregions

The Southern and Northern California megaregions differ from other megaregions in the United States in their demographic, social, and economic characteristics. Southern California particularly stands out among the megaregions as the most diverse. It is the only megaregion where the majority of its residents are people of color (58.2 percent), 38.5 percent of which are Latino. Of all the megaregions, Northern California has the largest share of Asian/Pacific Islander residents (14 percent) (see Figure 2).

In addition to Northern and Southern California being among the most racially diverse of the megaregions, they also have the largest foreign born populations. Twenty-nine percent of the Southern California and 23.9 percent of the Northern California megaregion populations were foreign born in 2000 (See Figure 3).

The Non-Hispanic White Dissimilarity Index illustrated in the chart below explains the relative segregation of the White population in these megaregions. While most megaregions experience declining segregation between 1990 and 2000, Southern California actually became more segregated over the decade. Southern California's Non-Hispanic White population became slightly more segregated (from 49.98 to 50.1) and Northern California only experienced a slight decline (from 40.45 to 40.2) between 1990 and 2000.

10 The underlying data is being assembled as part of two related collaborative research projects: Building Resilient Regions, funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (http://www-iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/brr) and Just Growth: Linking Regional Equity and Regional Economic Development with funding from the Ford Foundation.

11 In Northern California, our megaregion definition leaves out the rural counties of Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Colusa, Glenn, Mariposa and Sierra. Combined these counties had a population of 142,804 people in 2000, or 1.2% of the total megaregion population as defined by RPA.

Megaregion	Figure 3 % Foreign Born 2000	Figure 4 Non-Hispanic White Dissimilarity Index, 1990-2000 1990	2000	Figure 5 Per Capita Income 2000	Figure 6 Employment Growth 1990-2000	Figure 8 Poverty Rate, 1990-2000 1980	1990	2000	Figure 9 % Working Poor Households 2000
Arizona Sun Corridor	13.6	45.51	44.70	$21,054	39.4	11.87	14.34	12.90	9.6
Cascadia	11.3	32.16	29.07	$23,369	22.3	9.66	10.44	10.22	6.3
Gulf Coast	8.6	49.83	46.97	$16,566	17.1	18.85	23.52	20.00	14.6
Midwest	7.1	59.78	53.65	$22,251	10.2	9.94	11.63	10.05	6.1
Northeast	16.1	59.80	55.99	$25,609	3.4	11.10	9.81	10.77	5.5
Northern California	23.9	40.45	40.20	$25,656	10.8	10.54	11.38	12.12	6.9
Piedmont	7.2	51.18	46.75	$21,693	21.4	13.72	12.16	11.38	7.6
Southern California	29.0	49.98	50.10	$21,218	1.3	11.78	13.02	15.37	11.9
Southern Florida	18.6	52.58	46.95	$21,835	20.3	12.88	12.29	12.32	9.0
Texas Triangle	14.9	47.77	46.90	$21,415	23.1	12.48	15.24	13.07	11.0

Figure 7: Megaregion Income Growth and Income Distribution, 1990-2000



Southern and Northern California, along with the Northeast and Midwest, were the regions with the most stagnant employment increases during the 1990s; all four had employment growth ranging from 1.3 to 10.8 percent (See Figure 6). Despite these regions low employment growth, Northern California and the Northeast had the highest per capita incomes ($25,609 and $25,656, respectively) (See Figure 5).

While all megaregions experienced growth in median household income, Southern and Northern California, along with the Northeast, had the highest increases in the ratio of income at the 80th and 20th percentile, indicating a rise in inequality over the decade (See Figure 7). Note the regression line running through the observations: it suggest that improvements in growth and equity go hand-in-hand. As noted earlier, however, the sample size is too small to test for the direction of causality.

Though poverty rates in California are not as high as in the Gulf Coast, poverty in both California megaregions has been steadily increasing since the 1980s. By 2000, Southern California had the second highest poverty rate of all megaregions, at 15.4 percent, up from 11.8 percent in 1980. (See Figure 8).

Part of the problem in Southern California has been a high level of working poverty (defined as a household living below 150 percent of the poverty level in which the total hours worked by household members exceed that associated with a full-time, year-round job).[12] The fact that the poor are working raises an important issue: addressing their needs involves improving wages, not simply enhancing employment levels. A growth strategy, in short, is not enough.

The indicators above outline the unique conditions facing the Northern and Southern California megaregions, in relation to other U.S. megaregions. Of all the megaregions, they have the most racially diverse and largest immigrant populations, and are challenged with low employment growth, increasing inequality, and increases in poverty rates. The following section will further explore these two regions, paying particular attention to intraregional variations.

12 For an explanation of this definition and a comparison to alternatives, see Manuel Pastor Jr. and Justin Scoggins, Working Poor In the Golden State: A Multi-Measure Comparison Using the 2000 And 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples (Santa Cruz, CA: Center for Justice, Tolerance and Community, UC Santa Cruz). http://cjtc.ucsc.edu/docs/r_golden_state.pdf

The Northern and Southern California Megaregions

In 2000, the Northern California megaregion had approximately 12.1 million residents and the Southern California megaregion had roughly 20.4 million. While the Northern California population is more evenly distributed between the core and periphery, the Southern California population is most heavily concentrated in the core.

In Northern California, both the core and sphere of influence have a larger share of non-white populations than the periphery. Nearly three-fourths of the Asian/Pacific Islander and over half of the Black population live in the core of the megaregion (See Figure 12). Approximately 80 percent of the megaregion's Latino population is evenly distributed between the core and the periphery (See Figure 13).

The non-White population comprises 64.3 percent of the Southern California megaregion's core population. The Latino population is the largest non-white demographic group throughout the entire megaregion; and Asian/Pacific Islanders and Blacks are more likely to be found in the core than in the periphery and sphere of influence (See figures 14 and 15).

Both the core in the Northern and Southern California megaregions have the largest percentages of immigrant populations; 29.3 and 34.9 percent respectively. The spheres of influence have a slightly higher share of immigrants than the peripheries in both Northern and Southern California.

As mentioned earlier, Northern and Southern California were among the megaregions with relatively low rates of employment growth during the 90s. Southern California, in particular, only had a 1.3 percent increase in employment during the decade; and a closer examination of where employment growth occurred in the megaregion reveals a sharp decrease during this period in the core (-3.7 percent) and the greatest increase in employment taking place in the megaregion's periphery, with 12.3 percent growth in the 1990s (see Figure 17). In Northern California, the core's employment growth was also the lowest, at 7.3 percent, relative to the periphery and sphere of influence (15.2 percent and 14.4 percent, respectively). It was, however, still positive and this stands in sharp contrast to the sort of hollowing out of employment in the Southern California core.

Figures 10 and 11: NoCal and SoCal Population 2000



There is much greater variation in per capita income between the core, periphery, and sphere of influence in the Northern California megaregion than in the Southern California megaregion. Per capita income in Northern California's core is twice as high ($31,967) as it is in the region's sphere of influence ($15,614) in 2000 (see Figure 18). Between 1990 and 2000, per capita income in Northern California's sphere of influence slightly declined from $15,656 to $15,614. Southern California's per capita income more consistently ranged between a low of $19,384 in the megaregion's periphery to a high of $21,867 in the megaregion's core. The Southern California core's per capita income only slightly increased 2.2 percent from $21,401 in 1990 to $21,867 in 2000.

Figures 12 and 13: NoCal Demographics by Geography



Figures 14 and 15: SoCal Demographics by Geography



Income inequality has increased in both megaregions between 1990 and 2000. The Northern California core experienced the largest increase in the ratio of income of those at the 80th percentile of the household income distribution to those at the 20th percentile, from 3.89 to 4.25 (see Figure 19). The rise in income inequality in Southern California was both consistent across the decade and throughout the megaregion. The core, in particular, had the highest 80-20 income ratio in 2000 of 4.77.

Similarly, when we examine poverty rates in Northern California, poverty is higher in the megaregion's principal cities compared to the suburbs, and was especially the highest (23.1 percent) in the sphere of influence's principal cities (see Figure 20). Poverty in Southern California is also higher in the principal cities than it is in the suburbs. However, poverty in this megaregion is greatest in the core's principal cities (18.9 percent). There is also significant difference in relative poverty rates between core, periphery, and sphere of influence in each of the megaregions. In Northern California, poverty rates are higher in the periphery than in the core, and highest yet in the remote sphere of influence. In Southern California, in contrast, poverty rates are more similar across the entire megaregion. What is evident in both megaregions, to a certain extent, is a ring of suburbs with lower poverty rates around the core, and higher poverty rates concentrated in both the urban core and in the remote and peripheral areas of the Central Valley (Northern California), and Inland Empire (Southern California) (see Figure 21).

The concentration of poverty, as indicated by the percent of poor in high poverty tracts (that is, tracts where more than twenty percent of the population falls below the poverty level), also reflects the variation in per capita income and poverty levels found across the Northern California megaregion. Nearly three times more of the poor population lives in high poverty tracts in the megaregion's sphere of influence (72 percent) than in the core (26 percent) (see Figure 22). In Southern California, the highest concentration of poverty is found in the megaregion's core (60 percent), compared to the periphery (44 percent) and the sphere of influence (49 percent).

Overall, what these statistics suggest is that perhaps the most important difference between Southern and Northern California is not so much the overall characteristics of each megaregion, but the internal contrasts between the cores and peripheries within each region, with start contrasts in Northern California that are more muted in Southern California. This contrast in internal dynamics is even more evident when looking at the politics of equity advocates in each megaregion, a topic to which we now turn.

Figure 16: Percent Immigrant, 2000

	Northern California	Southern California
Core	29.3%	34.9%
Periphery	17.7%	19.3%
Sphere of Influence	20.1%	21.0%

Figure 17: Employment Growth, 1990-2000

	Northern California	Southern California
Core	7.3%	–3.7%
Periphery	15.2%	12.3%
Sphere of Influence	14.4%	8.7%

Figure 18: Per Capita Income, 1990-2000

	Northern California			Southern California		
	1980	1990	2000	1980	1990	2000
Core	$9,553	$20,222	$31,967	$8,562	$16,949	$21,867
Periphery	$7,586	$14,736	$21,108	$7,567	$14,947	$19,384
Sphere of Influence	$6,626	$11,477	$15,614	$7,719	$15,275	$21,235

Figure 19: 80-20 Income Ratio, 1990-2000

	Northern California		Southern California	
	1990	2000	1990	2000
Core	3.89	4.25	4.29	4.77
Periphery	3.86	4.07	3.92	4.18
Sphere of Influence	4.32	4.38	3.98	4.25

Figure 20: Poverty Rate, 2000



Figure 22: Percent of Poor in High Poverty Tracts, 2000

	Northern California	Southern California
Core	26%	60%
Periphery	41%	44%
Sphere of Influence	72%	49%

Figure 21: Poverty Map, 2000



IV. Politics of Megaregional Equity in Northern and Southern California

A megaregion is not an easy scale for engagement for any political force in our society, much less for equity advocates. With no formal government structures, and large distances making face-to-face contact difficult, megaregions have been almost invisible in most analyses of political dynamics in the U.S. With increasing attention to megaregions as a spatial form of urbanization and planning, however, we are now at a stage of beginning to try to understand political processes at that scale as well.

In comparing megaregional politics in Northern and Southern California, what emerges most dramatically is the differences in the social and economic constituencies that have been leaders in megaregional efforts. In Northern California, since the early 1990s, business interests have become strongly organized at a regional scale, first in the Bay Area and then increasingly in the Central Valley. In the process they have created a "networked-regionalism" that shapes common growth strategies across the megaregion, centered around notions of cluster promotion, public-private partnerships, and civic entrepreneurship. Equity advocates have, by and large, organized at a regional scale primarily in response to these business-led regionalism strategies, with significant success injecting equity into regional political processes, but to date with somewhat less success in creating networked regional equity strategies across the megaregion. Only amongst environmental justice advocates to date has there emerged megaregional scale organizing networks, which again emerged largely in response to megaregional political processes related to air and water quality, but even here, there has been a strong tendency to migrate to statewide policy processes, as a more effective arena for realizing social change than the megaregional scale.

In Southern California, in contrast, the business community has been much more fragmented than in Northern California, without being able to build a single unified, strong vision for growth within the region, much less at a megaregional scale. At the megaregional scale, it is only in the logistics and transportation industry where a megaregional agenda has emerged, but it has been the regional council of governments, rather than business leaders per se, that has provided a leading voices. In the context of this semi-vacuum, regional equity advocates have achieved remarkable success in shaping political agendas at a regional scale in Los Angeles. Moving from the region to megaregion, however, has yet to emerge as a major priority for equity advocates, though in the past few years there have emerged coordinated efforts to engage megaregional agendas in the logistics industry, especially in the region's port complexes.

Northern California Megaregion—Networked Regionalism and the Equity Agenda

Northern California has historically been rooted in the San Francisco Bay Area, and the Bay Area in turn has historically centered on San Francisco itself, known simply as "the City" to locals in a way that symbolizes its centrality.[13] San Francisco was previously the largest employment and population center of the entire region and the home to many of the financial service firms and corporate headquarters that were important in the early development of the northern part of the state, influencing port and manufacturing development in the Bay itself, but also far-flung mining, agriculture, water, and electricity networks throughout the megaregion. Until the 1980s, San Jose in the South Bay was considered to be a backwater, essentially Los Angeles without the charm – and in the Bay Area, L.A. is not regarded as highly charming.

The 1990s, however, brought a dramatic realignment of power and prestige: propelled by the internet boom, the South Bay / Silicon Valley became the Northern California megaregion's economic engine, San Jose rose in both power and sophistication, and "the City" became the site for back office operations and Web design. As 'high-tech' industries spread out from their early origins around Stanford University, they not only spread throughout the Bay Area, but began to have a dramatic influence in the Sacramento region and Central Valley as well. A range of high-tech businesses, including Apple Computers, Hewlett-Packard, Intel, NEC, and a host of smaller firms, began opening operations in the Sacramento region in the 1990s. Sky-rocketing housing prices in the Bay Area led to dramatic growth in housing developments in the peripheral areas of the Bay, such as Vallejo, and the Tri-Valley area of Livermore/Pleasanton/Dublin, but also sprawling into Central Valley towns as far flung as Tracy and Stockton, as many Bay Area workers chose to endure multi-hour commutes in exchange for more affordable living circumstances. Such new residential developments, of course, led to a growth in attendant locally serving employment as well, with shopping centers, auto malls, and entertainment centers springing up where agricultural crops used to grow.

The Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, however, are far more than simply spillover sites for lower cost housing and land from the Bay Area. Sacramento itself traces its history as a city back to the Gold Rush days, and has been the home of the state legislature since 1854, and permanent state capital since 1879. Over the years it has developed a diversified economic base, with now nearly a quarter of the workforce employed in government, and strong concentrations of employment in logistics, warehousing, and transportation, as well as electronics, and the ubiquitous health care and education sectors. Cities throughout the region, from Fresno in the south to Woodland and beyond in the north, developed in the 1800s as commercial centers and sites for agro-food processing, within one of the richest agricultural regions in the world (Walker 2004). The wealth generated in these agriculture and agro-food processing industries created a dynamic of growth and change in the region that operates largely independently from the dynamics of spill-over growth from the Bay Area. Similarly, unique patterns of immigration (ranging from Eastern European and Asian in the 1800s, through to increasing Latino immigration throughout the 20th century) also create local conditions and dynamics in the Central Valley and foothills that are quite distinct from the Bay Area.

13 See (Brechin 1999) for a compelling account of San Francisco's role in shaping development throughout Northern California from pre-Gold Rush days.

What *is* common in both the Bay Area and Central Valley is significant and growing levels of inequality. In the Bay Area, this seems to be driven by what has been described as an hourglass employment structure. Relative high percentages of highly-paid engineers, programmers, technicians and professional staff in the region reflect the scientific and knowledge intensive nature of information technology industries, and the high level of research and development conducted in the region. At the same time, relatively low-paid workers in the service industries, including clerical staff, building services (janitorial, landscaping), cafeteria, laundry, and security guards, kept the economic machine running – and there were relatively few middle-level positions in-between. Conditions for these workers and their families were exacerbated by the scorching housing market, which drove displacement and gentrification in many low-income neighborhoods.[14]

In the Central Valley, poverty and inequality are driven by the high percentage of employment in low-paying agricultural industries, with large percentages of immigrant workers driving poverty rates in the region to some of the highest in the country. Indeed, as of 2000, Fresno not only ranked 4th in poverty levels of all metropolitan regions in the country, with 26.2 percent of the population living below the poverty line, but it ranked first in concentrated poverty, with 43.5 percent of poor individuals living in census tracts where at least 40 percent of the population had income below the poverty level (Berube and Katz 2005). With high levels of immigration, low education levels, more limited English abilities, and highly concentrated in certain neighborhoods, many poor residents of the Fresno region are marginalized from the growing sectors of the economy and urban growth on the northeastern edges of the city (Berube 2006).

Networked Regionalism and Civic Entrepreneurialism

In this complex, unequal, highly diversified and yet partially integrated megaregion, business interests have taken the lead in shaping political dynamics, starting first from a base in metropolitan regions, and building towards a networked-regionalism at the megaregional scale. Indeed, the San Francisco Bay Area has been one of the strongest sites of business regionalism in the country. By the early 1990s, organizations like the Bay Area Council,[15] the Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group,[16] and Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network[17] were all on the rise, and providing models for public-private ventures throughout the country.

Efforts to extend these structures to a megaregional scale, however, have not materialized. Instead, civic leaders in the Bay Area have reached to their counterparts in the Central Valley through prominent networking organizations, creating a sort of overlapping governance network of parallel regionalist groups. Prominent regional organizations in Northern California outside the Bay Area itself include the Sierra Business Council,[18] established in 1994 and one of the early leaders in the new regionalism of the 1990s, and Valley Vision,[19] also established in 1994, which has played a prominent role in the Sacramento area. In the Fresno area, there have been a series of

14 Between January 1996 and January 2001, the median house price in Santa Clara County, the core of Silicon Valley, more than doubled, rising from $251,000 to $577,500. By the 4th quarter of 2007, the median-priced home in the Valley was selling for an astonishing $845,300, the highest of any metropolitan region in the nation and more than 4 times the national median price. All housing prices data is from the National Association of Realtors and is available at: http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/Pages/MetroPrice.

15 http://www.bayareacouncil.org

16 Renamed the Silicon Valley Leadership Group in 2005: http://www.svlg.net

17 http://www.jointventure.org

18 http://www.sbcouncil.org

19 http://www.valleyvision.org

regionalist organizations that have been formed, starting with the Fresno Business Council[20] (established in 1993), which is more of a traditional private-sector led organization, but has also played a leading role in promoting regional public-private collaborations. They played a key role in the creation of a comprehensive Fresno Area Collaborative Regional Initiative that was launched in 2001, and has subsequently evolved into a Regional Jobs Initiative[21] that has focused on cluster promotion and job creation in a number of key industries in the region. Finally, in 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed an executive order creating the California Partnership for the San Joaquin Valley,[22] a public private partnership covering an 8-county region, with over $5 million in additional earmarked funds to improve the region's economic vitality and quality of life.

These various regionalist organizations have developed somewhat independently, but also significantly through the support of various networking and consulting organizations that have promoted this "new regionalism". A prominent figure in this movement was Nick Bollman, a program officer at the Irvine Foundation, who developed a program in the early and mid 1990s to foster "new regionalism" in California, and provided key funding for these new regional formations. Eventually Bollman initiated a stand alone organization called the California Center for Regional Leadership[23] to carry this work forward and build networks between regional leadership groups. Another prominent 'policy entrepreneur'[24] supporting the development of this networked regionalism is a group called Collaborative Economics, led by Doug Henton. Created in the early 1990s, Collaborative Economics was one of the early advisors to Joint Venture: Silicon Valley, and has continued to be a key advisor to regions throughout the state, and indeed the world.

At the core of the vision guiding all of these regionalist efforts are essentially three key elements. First, is the importance of collaboration between public and private entities, to overcome limitations of existing jurisdictional boundaries and break from old traditions of separation and conflict that they argue have contributed to holding regions back. Building such collaboration is made possible by the leadership of 'civic entrepreneurs'—leaders who are able to forge new, collaborative relationships, particularly between business and government, but also with educational institutions and the broader education constituency (Henton 1997, 2003). The importance of this civic leadership is reflected in the second broad element of this approach, which is rooted in the belief that economic competitiveness in a globalized, knowledge-based economy is also rooted, at least in some degree, to the health of the broader community, which requires civic engagement, not just business engagement. Quality of life, levels of traffic congestion, school performance, air quality, and so on are often seen as critical elements not just in social well-being, but in the very ability of regions to attract and retain skilled workers, promote collaborative knowledge sharing, and ultimately be able to compete successfully as a region. The third key element in this new regionalist approach is the core of the economic strategy, rooted in an approach of identifying and supporting competitive regional industry clusters, focusing on those driving industries that primarily export from the regional economy.

These various regionalist initiatives have had a remarkable success in Northern California (more so than in Southern California) and have developed a common vision for an economic development strategy throughout the megaregion, rooted in building a unified business coalition, working closely with public sector and community leadership, developing strategic approaches to supporting critical industry clusters, and promoting those visions through collaborative processes. But it is also significant that none of these efforts are operating at a megaregional scale. These regional collaboratives communicate regularly through networking opportunities, such as through the CCRL networks and other policy forums, sharing information, perspectives, and strategies. They do not, however, seem focused on developing a megaregional vision or set of planning processes. Indeed the only truly megaregional structures in Northern California are rooted in environmental issues (more on this below).

Within these regionalist structures, there is a certain attention to issues of social equity and expanding economic opportunities for disadvantaged sectors of society. The approach to addressing equity, however, is rooted in a belief in the power of good policy and enlightened civic leaders. There is little attention to building a specific base of support for achieving equity, and the collaborative approach tends to marginalize the more difficult political decisions where real conflicts of interest exist. Without an attention to building a strong constituency for equity, the ability and even interest of such business-led collaborations to effectively address equity issues is limited.

Equity Organizing in Northern California

Equity organizing efforts at a regional scale have taken root throughout Northern California with a substantial degree of success. The San Francisco Bay Area itself has been host to a wide series of regional organizing efforts. In Silicon Valley, for instance, the Central Labor Council, along with its affiliated non-profit Working Partnerships, has led labor and community groups throughout the region to come together to become a powerful political force, and they have achieved important equity victories ranging from a living wage, to universal health insurance for children in the region, to achieving important community benefits for local residents out of publicly subsidized development projects (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2008; Brownstein 2000). Similarly, the Urban Habitat Program has built a Bay Area wide, multi-sector and multi-county Social Equity Caucus[25] that has played a role as the social justice voice in a range of business-oriented regionalist efforts. Smart Growth organizations in the Bay Area have also embraced social justice, with the Transportation and Land Use Coalition[26] emerging from its roots in the late 1990s to an effective region-wide advocacy organization representing over 90 groups advocating policies that place social equity as a central component of transportation and land use decisions.

Regional equity organizing has also found important footholds in the Central Valley as well. In the Sacramento Region, for instance, ACORN led a nearly successful effort by a range of community groups to promote regional tax-base sharing (PolicyLink 2002), Legal Services of Northern California has led community-driven efforts to enforce fair-share affordable housing provisions (McCarthy 2002), and the Sacramento Housing Alliance is now heading up a growing Coalition on Regional Equity,[27] with the goal of building a multi-issue, multi-jurisdiction, multi-constituency political force for equity within the six-county Sacramento metropolitan region. Further south in the San Joaquin Valley, the original hotbed

20 http://www.fresnobc.org

21 http://www.fresnojri.org

22 http://www.sjvpartnership.org

23 www.calregions.org

24 See (Mintrom 1997) and (Roberts and King 1991) for discussions of the literature on policy entrepreneurs.

25 http://urbanhabitat.org/sec

26 http://www.transcoalition.org

27 http://www.equitycoalition.org/

of organizing for the United Farm Workers, region wide organizing around immigrants' rights and other critical regional issues continues through such networks as the Central Valley Partnership,[28] a range of faith-based initiatives affiliated with PICO California,[29] and other more decentralized peace and justice networks.[30]

While organizing at a regional scale has been powerful in the Bay Area, and increasing in the Central Valley, few base-building social justice organizations have focused on building organizational strength at a megaregional scale. Within the labor movement, for example, Central Labor Councils have been strong in San Jose, San Francisco, the East Bay and to a certain extent in Sacramento as well, but even within the Bay Area itself, they have operated largely autonomously, collaborating where needed on state-wide policy issues, but not engaged on megaregional scale organizing, or even on organizing within the broader Bay Area together. Within faith-based organizing networks, PICO has the strongest presence in California, with seven affiliates in the Bay Area and another eight in the Central Valley. The focus within the network, however, has been on building strong local organizations rooted in issues and political struggles that are possible with regular face-to-face communication. These local groups then come together, not at a megaregional scale but on broad state-wide campaigns, together with the six southern California affiliates, on policy issues such as universal health care and improved school programs. Only within the environmental justice community have formal coalitions been formed that have tried to address issues at a megaregional scale. The most prominent examples of this are the Environmental Justice Coalition for Water, and the Central Valley Air Quality Coalition.[31]The Environmental Justice Coalition for Water (ECJW)[32] is a coalition of more than 50 community based and intermediary organizations within California, with the goal of educating, empowering, and nurturing a community-based coalition that will serve as a public voice and be an effective advocate for environmental justice issues in California water policy. Its scope is currently state-wide, but it was founded in 1999 with the goal of addressing the lack of community concerns in the CALFED Bay-Delta Program, a collaborative effort to manage water provision in the entire San Francisco Bay/Sacramento Delta watershed. This watershed boundary stretches beyond Goose Lake on the north-east border of California, to the mountains south of Bakersfield, and provides water to more than 22 million California residents (Innes et al. 2006, 2006). CALFED began in the early 1990s as an informal effort to collaborate between state and federal authorities over management of this vast ecosystem. It now involves 25 state and federal agencies, and at least 35 major stakeholders. By 2004, it had evolved into a formal agency, with legislatively established oversight authority.

The EJCW was successful in getting CALFED to create a formal subcommittee on environmental justice, but much of the discussion within CALFED got bogged down in process and participation. An analysis of this process concluded that there have been few discernible impacts on water policy to date, with a significant increase in suspicion and lack of trust:

> The emergence of EJ within CALFED offered the opportunity for a new, more democratic and collaborative way to manage water in California. Because such access to decision-making had previously been lacking, even cynics within the EJ groups considered this a possible opportunity to influence the disposition of water as a public trust resource. Within 3 years however, the golden opportunity had dissolved, leaving in its wake even greater cynicism about the state agencies' interest in sharing control over what was increasingly a privatized resource and one managed under privileged decision making processes. The reduction of trust that accompanied the treatment of EJ by CALFED makes it even harder to reconcile differences between agencies and community groups representing low-income communities and communities of color (Shilling, London, and Levanos Forthcoming).

The Central Valley Air Quality Coalition[33] is another megaregional partnership of more than 70 organizations. It was formally established in 2004, after previous efforts of more informal collaboration. Though it is primarily focused on improving health and air quality within the San Joaquin Valley, its members come from across the megaregion, and even the Los Angeles basin (see Figure 23). Despite the megaregional character of its membership, and focus on the broad San Joaquin Valley, much of the work of the coalition has been focused on state legislative actions. The coalition in fact emerged out of a 2003 legislative battle over emissions in dairy farms in the valley, which had certain exemptions from air quality regulations that were subsequently removed. Other legislative battles have related to: expanding the scope and structure of the San Joaquin Valley Air Pollution Control District to address pesticide use in the valley; efforts to establish a network of air monitoring stations throughout the valley, and prohibiting the use of experimental pesticides in schools (Kirsch Foundation 2006).

Thus, while there are some interesting and potentially quite exciting nascent megaregional scale equity organizing initiatives in Northern California, to date they remain limited to the environmental justice field, and even there, organizers have focused much of their attention on state-level campaigns, where the possibility of achieving meaningful change seems more likely. These political dynamics are also somewhat similar in Southern California, to which we now turn.

Southern California and the Equity Challenge

Southern California has historically been viewed as a land of opportunity: the region was the beacon for migrants of all ethnicities and origins, ranging from whites escaping the Oklahoma Dust Bowl to African Americans fleeing Southern Jim Crow to Latin Americans and Asians leaving behind economic despair and political repression in their home countries. They often arrived in gritty circumstances – the Hollywood lure of easily remaking oneself in the Southland was only partially true – but temporal mobility, usually fueled by an extraordinary range of well-paying industrial jobs, gave meaning to an American Dream.

Something, however, went wrong in the 1980s and 1990s. Regional manufacturing shrank in tandem with the general deindustrialization of the country, and then was rocked by a sharp economic downturn in the early 1990s. The 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles and its environs exposed the scars of

28 http://www.citizenship.net/index.shtml

29 http://www.picocalifornia.org/

30 http://www.fresnoalliance.com/

31 Other prominent EF organizations that operate across the megaregion include Californians for Pesticide Reform, a state-wide coalition of 182 groups focused on changing pesticide policies and practices; and Green Action, a coalition launched by California Communities Against Toxics. These organizations, however, operate primarily at a state or multi-state level.

32 http://www.ejcw.org/

33 http://www.calcleanair.org/

Figure 23: CVAQ Coalition Members



spatial inequality, with a neighborhood's median income serving as a better predictor of riot damage than resident ethnicity (Pastor 1995). And tense political battles over Affirmative Action and immigration – occurring on a statewide level but often exacerbated in Southern California – erupted in ways that reflected increasing unease with the changing demographics of the megaregion.

As the 2000 census results emerged, three things became clear. First, while the rest of the country had generally seen a decrease in concentrated poverty over the 1990s, poverty concentration actually rose in the various metros that comprise the Southern California megaregion. Second, the area, particularly Los Angeles County, saw a sharp increase in "working poverty," suggesting that the issue lay only partly with employment levels and was instead related to the shifting composition of the economy and slipping wages for available employment. Third, the changing demography that marked central Los Angeles had spread across the entire region, with enhanced immigration creating issues of social dislocation and challenges for assimilation and mobility.

Responding to the Challenge

Even if there is a "commonality of disparity" at the regional scale, however, it is not entirely clear that this is the right level at which to respond. Part of the problem is that there are very few policy levers at the megaregional level; while the region does have a rather large Council of Governments (the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) covers six major counties) large parts of what is included in the megaregion is not included in this governance structure. This is not just a problem for equity; Tietz and Barbour (2007) also point to the relative lack of megaregion authority over issues like growth management and suggest that the only real traction to be gained is around infrastructure investments – a point that will be important later.

Figure 24: Percent Change in Foreclosures, 2006 (4Q) to 2007 (4Q).



Of course, the megaregional scale does have an impact on equity, sometimes in ways not fully imagined. For example, higher housing prices in the core (in both Northern and Southern California) have often forced low and moderate income families further out in the commuting shed; the current housing downturn is slashing values in those outlying areas more rapidly and the resulting foreclosures destroying only recent garnered home owner equity. See, for example, the rate of change in foreclosures broken out by geography in Figure 24; foreclosure rates have been rising more rapidly in the periphery than in the core (with lower rates in the sphere, partly because these areas are actually generally beyond the real commute shed).[34] In any case, there are clear equity concerns here – both home equity and social equity.

However, while it may be clear why Bakersfield, San Diego, and Los Angeles might team up to build a bullet train, it is less clear why equity proponents in all three areas would link together around income or housing values rather than just link with their Northern California allies to, say, raise the state minimum wage or organize a federal bailout out of those who received predatory loans. In essence, the *political* rationale for the megaregion is less apparent in the realm of equity. What we wish to explore here is whether or not political constituencies can in fact be mobilized at the level of the Southern California megaregion – and to do that, we need to consider how such constituencies have been mobilized to "jump scale" in the preexisting regional equity movement. And one of the best places to do that is the core of the core of Southern California – the city of Los Angeles.

Los Angeles and Regional Equity

Los Angeles would seem to be an unlikely place for new formulations about urban form and social equity: it has long been regarding as a poster child for sprawl and one of its main claims to fame in the early decades of the twentieth century was the viciously anti-union tenor of its employers, police, and main newspaper. It was a city run by elites whose nouveau riche origins worked against any sense of noblesse oblige; it was not until the city burned in the 1960s that the business-led Committee of 25 quietly reconfigured politics to support the reform regime of Mayor Tom Bradley (with the price of that support being his commitment to a corporate version of downtown development). Racially tinged riots – the Zoot Suit riots of 1943, the Watts riots of 1965, and the L.A. civil unrest of 1992 – have come with surprising regularity and the multicultural mix of the city has sometimes seemed more like a cauldron than a stew.

34 Foreclosure data is taken at the county level from DataQuick; see http://www.dqnews.com/RRFor0108.shtm .

But several of the innovations that Jones (2007) mentions as possible remedies for social disparities – community benefits agreements, a fairer distribution of transportation resources, and the creation of urban parklands – emerged early in the City of Angels. While a full consideration of the reason why are beyond the scope of this short piece, we would point to three important factors: the relative fragmentation of the business class in Los Angeles, the emergence of new labor organizing, and the adoption of a regional lens by a wide array of community organizations.

The underlying or structural reasons for business fragmentation are complex, ranging from the collapse of the region's major manufacturing industries to the simultaneously global and atomistic nature of one of the region's main sectors, entertainment. But it is reflected and refracted in the departure of corporate headquarters from the city, the ownership of the major news daily by out-of-towners (until recently the Chicago Tribune syndicate and now real estate developer Sam Zell), and the growing presence of smaller, often immigrant-owned, companies who often have little time for civic leadership. The result is that while the Bay Area has seen the emergence of a series of business-led organizations competing to be the main regional voice on public policy and economic growth, Los Angeles firms and business leaders have been almost entirely absent in the ranks of California's "civic entrepreneurs."[35]

This has created an opening for other voices, particularly those of labor. In her remarkable book, *L.A. Story*, sociologist Ruth Milkman (2006) accounts for the recent rise of unions in the city and the region through a focus of the intersection of four industries and immigrant labor, and an emphasis on the role of professional organizers. Where the story could be more complete is in its geographic aspect: the famous Justice for Janitors campaign was explicitly regional in its scope, labor's political activities were likewise about securing city and county power, and the labor-affiliated think tank, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), has been overtly regional in its analysis of problems and its strategy for solutions. LAANE, for example, has targeted regional attractions, such as the Staple Center and the Los Angeles Airport, for securing community benefits, it has pursued a series of living wage campaigns across multiple jurisdictions, and its latest efforts have involved forming coalitions with environmentalist and environmental justice proponents to reconfigure operations at L.A.'s ports in a way that will both reduce pollution and improve job quality.

This regional emphasis by labor has been accompanied by a new regional stance on the part of many community-based groups. When the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach came together (with their respective ports and the regional transportation agency) to support the building of a high-speed rail line to transport imported goods through South L.A., community groups forged an Alameda Corridor Jobs Coalition and secured the largest local hiring program in U.S. history. When the regional transportation authority decided to address traffic congestion by supporting the development of light rail that could serve outlying suburbs, organizers formed a Bus Riders Union that sued in court to protect and enhance the bus system that was the transit backbone for many inner-city residents. And when one leader in the region's entertainment industry, DreamWorks, sought a subsidy to locate in Los Angeles, it found itself negotiating for a job training program (that has eventually morphed in a broader effort called Workplace Hollywood) with a South Central-based group that had formed a "Metro Alliance" with components from all over the city (Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2008).

The regionalist epiphany for these community groups –and to a lesser extent, labor – seems to have been deeply connected to the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest. While this, along with the contemporaneous recession, gave a final push to several companies already seeking to abandon the region, more rooted organizations found themselves grappling with the need for a new approach to organizing and social justice. They soon began to think regionally; in the words of one activist, "If you want to help South L.A. you can't talk about South L.A. apart from the region."[36] And they have had their influence on the city's mayor, Antonio Villaraigosa, who campaigned in 2005 on a promise to help the city "grow smarter, grow greener, grow together, and grow more civic-minded."[37] Many of his first moves as mayor, including resolving a labor dispute to protect the regional tourist industry and taking a leadership position in the regional transportation agency, one eschewed by the former mayor, signaled his understanding and commitment to a regional equity and regional growth agenda.

What About the Megaregion?

While it is hard to argue that the regional equity framework is fully planted in Los Angeles, the gains have been impressive. The last year has seen, for example, a quickly negotiated community benefits agreement (CBA) for the $2 billion Grand Avenue project in downtown L.A., signaling that CBAs are now standard practice. Labor has secured a new contract, complete with a forty percent boost in wages and benefits, for security guards working for companies that service eighty percent of commercial real estate in Los Angeles County. And the city has recently sought to slow down the transformation of industrial land to residential uses, hoping to preserve employment and reduce pressures for gentrification and displacement.

There is also a series of indicators that a megaregional approach to equity might be in the offing, not so much about housing or tax-sharing as about employment and infrastructure. This is in keeping with the admonitions of Tietz and Barbour (2007) regarding which policy areas might actually be relevant and gain political traction above the metro level. Pastor and Reed and Rubin do offer some ways in which to put an equity lens on infrastructure, suggesting that considerations of the eventual employment benefits are key (Pastor and Reed 2005; Rubin 2006). And a wide range of social justice and labor groups have become interested in the issues surrounding investments in the ports and support for the logistics industry in Southern California.

These are, after all, megaports and megaprojects – 40 percent of U.S. imports move through the Long Beach and Los Angeles ports – with megaconsequences for economic growth not limited to neighborhoods, cities, or metro areas (Kern County 2005). At the same, they do have highly local consequences: activities related to port operations and related trucking and intermodal switching yards are estimated to generate twenty percent of Southern California's total emissions of diesel particulates (Hricko 2008) and both the emissions and their attendant health consequences are concentrated in a band of communities stretching from the ports themselves along

35 The fragmentation has not gone unrecognized by business voices, particularly in light of the ability of labor and other equity voices to coalesce. In early 2008, leaders finally responded by unveiling the Los Angeles County Business Federation, a collection of 44 different chambers and other groups hoping to mirror the political success of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor. See Ronald D. White, "L.A. businesses to form new federation," Los Angeles Times, January 28, 2008, p. C3.

36 Thigpenn, Anthony. 2004. Personal interview.

37 The framing, in part, emerged during a period in which Villaraigosa had a part-time appointment as a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center for Sustainable Cities and helped co-facilitate a workshop on the future of metropolitan Los Angeles. That workshop produced a volume entitled *After Sprawl: Action Plans For Metropolitan Los Angeles* (see (Fulton et al. 2003), and a related and more academic work that emerged from a parallel process at the Center (Wolch, Pastor, and Dreier 2004).

freeway and train corridors that first head north, then east to warehousing operations in the Inland Empire of Riverside and San Bernardino. Local environmental justice groups hailing from Wilmington, the City of Commerce, and Riverside have banded together to form an arc of resistance that matches that trajectory – and they, along with allies in Northern California who are affected by port activity in Oakland, have been successful at generating new policies to clean up port operations.

The growth of port traffic is not all gloom. As SCAG leaders have pointed out, the logistics industry is likely to generate the sort of jobs that require lower levels of education and can offer a starting step to mobility for immigrant and other workers. The problem is that this is not automatic – that is, there is no guarantee that simply generating the employment will also generate the community benefits. The short-haul truckers near the port are a case in point. This would seem to be lucrative work, and the popular association of truckers with Teamsters conjures up images of protected employment and high wages. But the deregulation of the trucking industry led to the entrance of individual owner-operators and a demographic transformation: the percent of Latinos employed in trucking and warehousing went from 27 percent in 1980 to 71 percent in 2005. And under the contractor set of relationships, in which the individual is bearing the risk of maintaining the truck and companies have less reason to avoid wasting trucker time in queues, trucker wages have fallen to around $12 an hour after expenses (and without benefits).[38]

Making this megaindustry really equitable requires, in short, improving the quality of employment. A new and much more nimble labor movement has tried to do that by interjecting itself into the debate over the "greening" of the port, forming a Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports that has worked to support a Clean Air Action Plan that will require that 17,000 trucks be retrofitted or replaced to reduce emissions; since this will require deep financial pockets as well as ease of inspection over the results, the ports will develop a concessionaire system that will mean replacing the independent owners with larger companies that have straightforward employee relationships – and can thus be more easily organized. With this effort, labor has been able to bring environmentalists into a tentative and often wary support for expansion of logistics.

Labor unions are also setting their sights on the overall goods movements industry. Likening warehouse workers to janitors – they both do work hidden from public view, often for companies that are not the real economic actors (cleaning companies rather than the corporate owners of commercial real estate, a small warehouse owner rather than the Wal-Mart of whose supply chain he is a part) – labor is beginning to think about a campaign that can insure that the industry really does deliver on the promise that SCAG and others have raised. This is a true recipe for social justice at a megaregional level.

To get there will require an active presence across the megaregion. In addition to the linkage of environmental justice organizations, LAANE, the L.A.-based labor-community powerhouse has been able to join up with two other existing parallel organizations, the Coastal Alliance United for a Sustainable Economy (CAUSE) in Ventura/Santa Barbara and the Center for Policy Initiatives (CPI) in San Diego, and is seeding the creation of analogues in Orange County and the Inland Empire. Again, the community-based forces seem to be outpacing a more fragmented business class in Southern California.

38 The information on the demographic shift is taken from the 1980 Public Use Microdata Sample and the 2005 American Community Survey. The data on wages is from a report prepared by CGR Management Consultants for the Gateway Cities Council of Governments, A Survey Of Drayage Drivers Serving The San Pedro Bay Ports, March 26, 2007, http://www.gatewaycog.org/publications/Survey_of_Drayage_Drivers_Serving_the_San_Pedro_Bay_Ports.pdf

V. Conclusions: Megaregions and Equity Organizing

The political dynamics of processes shaping megaregional equity in California that we have described above raise certain cautions about megaregions being an effective scale for either understanding or addressing urban inequality. Clearly, we should be careful about generalizing from these particular cases to megaregions more generally. Every megaregion has its own unique characteristics and particular political processes that must be taken into account, and California's particular mix of demographic and economic characteristics is quite different from much of the country. Furthermore, the tendency we observe for political processes in California to essentially jump over the megaregional scale—rooted either in local/regional processes or state-level policies—is likely to look quite different in megaregions that cross multiple state boundaries. Nonetheless, we would make three distinct points, and a further over-arching conclusion, that we think are valid for all megaregions.

First, the processes affecting inequality that unfold primarily at a megaregional scale seem to be somewhat different than those that emerge at a regional scale. Megaregional labor markets, for example, are probably best understood as overlapping *regional* labor markets, rather than a single integrated *megaregional* labor market, since any job center is unlikely to draw more than a small minority of workers from beyond what would be considered the normal regional boundary. Similarly, housing markets—and related processes of local government finance, educational quality, and neighborhood characteristics—will also continue to be largely shaped by the location of jobs and the constraints of daily home-to-work commutes within overlapping regional economies, rather than megaregional ones, though tight housing markets in certain core regions can have important effects far beyond what historically we would have thought of as a normal regional commute shed.

There clearly are some economic processes that are increasingly unfolding at a megaregional scale, at least within some industry value-chains, but it is unclear to us whether these megaregional processes are really any more important than local or global linkages within these value chains. For example, the Silicon Valley-based technology firms, such as Intel, Apple and Hewlett-Packard, who have located important facilities in the Sacramento region, seem to be trying to simultaneously take advantage of lower land prices and the ability to move back and forth between facilities within a few hours drive. But are these intra-regional linkages any more important in explaining economic dynamics than other value-chain ties these firms have to facilities in Oregon, Arizona, and New Mexico, or even to China and India? Or than the *regional* relationships between locally serving and export-oriented industries that has long been the core of explaining regional economic dynamics? Clearly megaregional economic processes have some importance, but exactly how much is not entirely clear to us.

The processes that do seem to us to be increasingly taking root at a megaregional scale are those related to infrastructure—particularly infrastructure related to transportation and to management of environmental processes. The issues of the logistics industry in Southern California, and the processes linking the ports, distribution systems, and the location of intermodal transfer stations and warehouse facilities, seem increasingly to be unfolding at a megaregional scale in a way that we imagine has parallels in most, if not all megaregions of the U.S., if not the world. Similarly, there also seem to be important issues related to water provision, air quality, and associated health risks that stretch far beyond regional boundaries, and are perhaps best understood at the megaregional scale.

This brings us to our second point—that the opportunities for finding solutions to urban inequality at a megaregional scale remained limited. We think, for example, that creating affordable workforce housing is important – but we are hard pressed to believe that creating it in Bakersfield will solve the housing and employment problems for those in inner city Los Angeles. We think that transit-oriented developments are crucial and can create new opportunity – but we do not see many policy levers that do not already exist at the local level (through zoning) or the federal level (through various requirements) that are somehow open to political actors at the megaregional level. We think that regional tax-sharing is a good idea – but we do not see it gaining ground anywhere in the country and suspect that the megaregion is too distant and scattered a level for tax-sharing to happen.[39]

Nonetheless, there are signs that megaregional governance processes are emerging. In our case studies, these processes are primarily related to infrastructure and environmental issues, and these are likely to be issues in other metropolitan regions as well. Dewar and Epstein (2007) point to other, broader, megaregional planning processes that are increasingly emerging, and we do think it is important that all planning for growth and sustainability of megaregions be filtered through a social equity lens.

Which brings us to our third point: policy change does not occur simply because there are good ideas. Rather, it occurs when there are constituencies that are mobilized for change (and so reach for whatever good ideas they and others have generated). Yet the politics of equity at the megaregional level are difficult. Fortunately, however, we do not think that building megaregional scale coalitions for equity is essential, at least at this stage, for achieving equity. We do not think, for example, that it is really a matter of the relationship between metros within the megaregion – it is not whether residents in Riverside have rapid rail to employment in downtown L.A. for example – but rather whether the residents just across the river in East Los Angeles (virtually walking distance) have access to employment and to what kind of jobs, and whether poor residents of Riverside have ready access to decent employment and housing within their own region. So perhaps what is required are new alliances of social justice organizations that seek to lift up multiple distressed communities within their regions, while networking across the megaregion—a megaregional version of "network organizing" (Traynor and Andors 2005). Some organizations are stepping up to this task but it is a new and sometimes unnatural fit for groups that often have quite defined local bases. Interestingly, it is beginning to happen and it is definitely something to watch.

Thus, our final overarching point is that the contemporary study of megaregions needs to pay particular attention to the emerging constellation of social forces shaping these spaces, including actors in the business community, amongst policy and planning circles, and within equity coalitions. The current literature on megaregions often reads rather technically: megaregions are a new economic scale, we should plan for them more effectively, here's a policy package we can adopt. Yet the megaregion, like the metro or even the city, is a messy political space in which a rational decision-making process is often eschewed in favor of the rough clash of social forces, usually occurring at a lower level of governance and then bubbling up in a way that seems to maximize dysfunction.

Indeed, many of the features some deplore about megaregions – a sprawling consumption of land, an inability to coordinate housing and transit decisions – emerge precisely because of a Tieboutian desire of communities to be separate, and at the heart of that are issues of race, class, and segregation. Understanding these political and social dynamics is the stuff of political economy. More reliance on this area of study – theories of social movements, business collaboratives, and urban regimes – could enrich the field and provide guidance as to how we might generate both the policies *and* the political will to overcome fragmentation, link together cities and neighborhoods, and tackle social disparity in meaningful and sustainable ways.

39 Moreover, megaregions, because of their sharp differences between core and periphery metros in terms of income and housing costs, can result in an inequitable allocation of resources under tax-sharing: a stressed suburb in Los Angeles County, for example, can look rich compared to a bucolic neighborhood in Imperial County.

References

Berube, Alan. 2006. Confronting Concentrated Poverty in Fresno. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

Berube, Alan, and Bruce Katz. 2005. Katrina's Window: Confronting Concentrated Poverty Across America. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

Blackwell, Angela Glover, and Radhika K. . Fox. 2004. Regional Equity and Smart Growth: Opportunities for Advancing Social and Economic Justice in America. Oakland: PolicyLink.

Brechin, Gray. 1999. Imperial San Francisco: *Urban Power, Earthly Ruin*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brownstein, Bob. 2000. Working Partnerships: A New Political Strategy for Creating Living Wage Jobs. *Working USA* 4 (1):35-48.

Colburn, David, and Jeffrey Adler, eds. 2005. *African-American Mayors: Race, Politics and the American City*. Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Dewar, Margaret, and David Epstein. 2007. Planning for 'Megaregions' in the United States. *Journal of Planning Literature* 22 (2):108-124.

Eberts, Randall, George Erickcek, and Jack Kleinhenz. 2006. Dashboard Indicators for the Northeast Ohio Economy: Prepared for the Fund for Our Economic Future. In *Working Paper 06-05*. Cleveland, OH: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Feser, Edward, and Geoffrey Hewings. 2007. U.S. Regional Economic Fragmentation & Integration: Selected Empirical Evidence and Implications. Washington DC: Regional Plan Association.

Fulton, William, Jennifer Wolch, Antonio Villaraigosa, and Susan Weaver. 2003. After Sprawl: Action Plans for Metropolitan Los Angeles. Los Angeles: Center for Sustainable Cities, USC.

Glaeser, Edward L. 2007. "Do Regional Economies Need Regional Coordination?" Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute of Economic Research

Gottlieb, Robert, Regina Freer, Mark Vallianatos, and Peter Dreier. 2005. T*he Next Los Angeles: The Struggle for a Livable City*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Henton, Doug. 1997. *Grassroots Leaders for a New Economy: How Civic Entrepreneurs Are Building Prosperous Communities*. New York: Jossey Bass.

———. 2003. *Civic Revolutionaries: Igniting the Passion for Change in America's Communities*. New York: Jossey Bass.

Hricko, Andrea. 2008. Global Trade Comes Home. *Environmental Health Perspectives* 116 (2).

Innes, Judith, Sarah Connick, Laura Kaplan, and David Booher. 2006. Collaborative Governance in the CALFED Program: Adaptive Policy Making for California Water. Sacramento, CA: Center for Collaborative Policy, CSUS.

———. 2006. Water Management in California: CALFED as an Emergent Form of Governance.

John, Peter , Adam Tickell, and Steve Musson. 2005. Governing the Megaregion: Governance and Networks across London and the South East of England *New Political Economy* 10 (1):91-106.

Jones, Christopher. 2007. Economic and Equity Frameworks for Megaregions. Washington DC: Regional Plan Association.

KERNCOG, SANDAG, and SCAG. 2005. The Southern California Megaregion: A Case Study of Global Gateway Regions: America's Third Century Strategy. Washington DC: Regional Plan Association.

Kirsch Foundation. 2006. Annual Report 2006. Mountain View, CA: Kirsch Foundation.

McCarthy, Mike. 2002. Activists anticipate regional fight over low-income housing. *Sacramento Business Journal*, May 24, 2002.

Metcalf, Gabriel, and Egon Terplan. 2007. The Northern California Megaregion. *SPUR Urbanist* (466).

Milkman, Ruth. 2006. *The L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor Movement*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Mintrom, Michael. 1997. Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation. *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (3):738-770.

Orfield, Myron. 2002 *American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality* Washington, DC Brookings Institution Press.

Pastor, Manuel. 1995. Economic Inequality, Latino Poverty and the Civil Unrest in Los Angeles. *Economic Development Quarterly* 9 (3).

Pastor, Manuel, and Chris Benner. 2008. Been Down So Long: Week Market Cities and Regional Equity. In *Restoring Prosperity in Older Industrial Areas*, edited by R. McGahey and J. Vey. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Pastor, Manuel, Chris Benner, and Martha Matsuoka. 2008. *This Could Be the Start of Something Big: Regional Equity Organizing and the Future of Metropolitan America* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pastor, Manuel, Peter Dreier, Eugene Grigsby, and Marta Lopez-Garza. 2000. *Regions That Work: How Cities and Suburbs Can Grow Together, Globalization and community* ; v. 6. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pastor, Manuel, and Deborah Reed. 2005. Understanding Equitable Infrastructure for California. In *California 2025: Taking on the Future*, edited by E. Hanak and M. Baldassare. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

PolicyLink. 2002. Building a Healthier Sacramento Region: An Analysis of AB 680. Oakland: PolicyLink.

Puentes, Robert, and David Warren. 2006 One-fifth of the Nation: America's First Suburbs. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Roberts, Nancy C., and Paula J. King. 1991. Policy entrepreneurs: Their activity structure and function in the policy process. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 1 (2):147-155.

Rubin, Victor. 2006. Safety, Growth, and Equity: Infrastructure Policies That Promote Opportunity and Inclusion. Oakland, CA: PolicyLink.

Rusk, David. 1999. *Inside Game Outside Game: Winning Strategies for Saving Urban America*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Sassen, Saskia. 2007. Megaregions: Benefits beyond Sharing Trains and Parking Lots? In *The Economic Geography of Megaregions*, edited by K. Goldfield. Princeton, NJ: Policy Research Institute for the Region, Woodrow Wilscon School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

Shilling, Fraser, Jonathan London, and Raoul Levanos. Forthcoming. Third Parties and a Process of Elimination: Environmental Justice within and byond CALFED. *Science & Policy*.

Teitz, Michael, and Elisa Barbour. 2007. Megaregions in California: Challenges to Planning and Policy. In *Healdsburg Research Seminar on Megaregions*. Washington DC: Regional Plan Association.

Traynor, William, and Jessica Andors. 2005. Network Organizing: A Strategy for Building Community Engagement. *Shelterforce* (140).

Walker, Richard. 2004. The Conquest of Bread: *150 Years of Agribusiness in California*. New York: New Press.

Wolch, Jennifer, Manuel Pastor, and Peter Dreier. 2004. *Up Against the Sprawl: Public Policy and the Making of Southern California*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Appendix 1: Northern and Southern California Megaregional Definitions

Northern California Megaregion

CBSA	CBSA Name	Counties	Core/Periphery/Sphere
41860	San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Alameda	Core
		Contra Costa	
		Marin	
		San Francisco	
		San Mateo	
41940	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	San Benito	Core
		Santa Clara	
32900	Merced, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Merced	Periphery
33700	Modesto, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Stanislaus	Periphery
34900	Napa, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Napa	Periphery
40900	Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	El Dorado	Periphery
		Placer	
		Sacramento	
		Yolo	
41500	Salinas, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Monterey	Periphery
42100	Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Santa Cruz	Periphery
42220	Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Sonoma	Periphery
44700	Stockton, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	San Joaquin	Periphery
46700	Vallejo-Fairfield, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Solano	Periphery
49700	Yuba City, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Sutter	Periphery
		Yuba	
23420	Fresno, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Fresno	Sphere
25260	Hanford-Corcoran, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Kings	Sphere
31460	Madera, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Madera	Sphere
46020	Truckee-Grass Valley, CA Micropolitan Statistical Area	Nevada	Sphere
47300	Visalia-Porterville, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Tulare	Sphere

Southern California Megaregion

CBSA	CBSA Name	Counties	Core/Periphery/Sphere
31100	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Los Angeles	Core
		Orange	
37100	Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Ventura	Periphery
40140	Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Riverside	Periphery
		San Bernardino	
42060	Santa Barbara-Santa Maria, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Santa Barbara	Periphery
12540	Bakersfield, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Kern	Sphere
20940	El Centro, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	Imperial	Sphere
41740	San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area	San Diego	Sphere